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Abstract—A framework is presented for handling a potential
loss of observability of a dynamical system in a provably-safe way.
Inspired by the fragility of data-driven perception systems used
by autonomous vehicles, we formulate the problem that arises
when a sensing modality fails or is found to be untrustworthy
during autonomous operation. We cast this problem as a differen-
tial game played between the dynamical system being controlled
and the external system factor(s) for which observations are
lost. The game is a zero-sum Stackelberg game in which the
controlled system (leader) is trying to find a trajectory which
maximizes a function representing the safety of the system, and
the unobserved factor (follower) is trying to minimize the same
function. The set of winning initial configurations of this game
for the controlled system represent the set of all states in which
safety can be maintained with respect to the external factor, even
if observability of that factor is lost. This is the set we refer to as
the Eyes-Closed Safety Kernel. In practical use, the policy defined
by the winning strategy of the controlled system is only needed to
be executed whenever observability of the external system is lost
or the system deviates from the Eyes-Closed Safety Kernel due to
other, non-safety oriented control schemes. We present a means
for solving this game offline, such that the resulting winning
strategy can be used for computationally efficient, provably-safe,
online control when needed. The solution approach presented
is based on representing the game using the solutions of two
Hamilton-Jacobi partial differential equations. We illustrate the
applicability of our framework by working through a realistic
example in which an autonomous car must avoid a dynamic
obstacle despite potentially losing observability. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Before deploying autonomous systems into uncontrolled
environments, a degree of confidence in the ability of those
systems to operate safely and proficiently is obviously needed.
This need is exacerbated for safety-critical systems that can
become dangerous in their failure modes. One way to generate
confidence in a system is to prove safety properties for a
model of the system. Although such an exercise is imperfect—
the modeling assumptions on the system may not hold in
practice—the space over which the assumptions do hold be-
comes a validated operating region in which the performance
of the system is guaranteed.
In this article, we present a method for generating a control
scheme for which the safety of the modeled system can be
proven, without assuming the persistence of observability of
the system. In system analysis, an observation model for the
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Fig. 1. Graphic Depiction of the Loss of Observability Situation. When plan-
ning avoidance maneuvers, the vehicle must assume what type of observations
it will receive of the cat in the future. If it assumes it will continue to observe
the cat for the duration of the trajectory, it can plan a maneuver which relies
on the ability to sense and avoid the cat. This situation is depicted in the top
pane of the graphic. At the time the vehicle reaches the location of the cat,
it avoids the cat through a region that the cat could have been in, but was
detected to not be in. Alternatively, if the vehicle assumes it will not receive
further observations, or might lose them at any time, its avoidance trajectories
will be distinctly different. These maneuvers must avoid all regions in which
the cat might be, because the vehicle cannot observe it and determine its exact
location. The trajectory in the top pane might be preferred, but might not be
safe if observations are lost halfway through the maneuver. The difference
between these two models is subtle but important. The design of controllers
which are safe with respect to this latter paradigm is the topic of this article.
system is assumed. Common variants of observation models
include full observations (all state dimensions of the system
are observed), partial observations (only some state dimen-
sions are observed), and noisy observations (observations are
corrupted by noise). Typically, however, these observation
models are assumed to be constant throughout the mission
of the autonomous system. We relax that assumption to allow
for cases in which the observability of the system (or part of
the system) might suddenly be lost.
Losses of system observability have always been an impor-
tant consideration, as sensors can fail for various reasons, but
accounting for these losses has become increasingly necessary
as the perception modules used in modern autonomous vehi-
cles have transitioned to data-driven components. It is very
hard to verify that these components will always function as
intended, especially if the input data encountered at run-time is
dissimilar to the data for which those systems were trained on.
This poses a significant issue for safety-critical systems. We
would like to be able to leverage the advances and strengths
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of data-driven techniques, yet we desire that the autonomous
systems that we develop are still provably safe.
One approach to developing such systems might derive from
anomaly detection, which aims to predict whether the input
data is anomalous with respect a previously-verified data set,
and therefore has a high risk of causing the sensing modality
to fail. This is potentially an easier problem than guaranteeing
correctness over geometric regions of the data space. If it
is accepted that the sensing modality can fail unexpectedly
during operation, care must be taken so that the autonomous
system is able to maintain safe and proficient operation despite
such failures potentially happening during dynamic situations.
The purpose and contribution of this article is the design
of a control scheme which can guarantee safe handling of
a detected loss of observability of the autonomous system
or factors it interacts with. We design such a controller
by formulating and solving a differential game representing
the situation of interest. We do not address the challenge
of correctly detecting anomalous inputs to the data-driven
algorithms (or other predictions of failure), and instead point
to the growing literature of methods interested in addressing
that problem, such as [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6] to list just a
few. The framework presented here is complementary to those
methods, offering a mathematically sound means of handling
such detected anomalies in the context of autonomous systems.
A graphical overview of the problem formulation is depicted
in Figure 1. We use this graphic to reiterate the key difference
between the method presented here and that of the standard
safe obstacle avoidance paradigms. Typical formulations of
obstacle avoidance can similarly be cast as a differential game
such as in [7], although those and other formulations assume
(to the best of our knowledge) that the observation model
is persistent. Under the standard assumption, avoidance
trajectories are planned assuming that the system will be
able to sense and react to obstacles in the future. This is
in contrast to the framework we present, where avoidance
trajectories are generated assuming that observations will
potentially be lost at any instant. Again, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to account for such situations
in a provably safe way.
Before presenting this framework in detail, we summarize
the contributions we make:
• We develop a mathematical formulation of the loss of
observability scenario as a zero-sum, differential Stack-
elberg game.
• We develop a novel means of computing a global solution
to the game by showing how it can be equivalently ex-
pressed through two related partial differential equations.
We derive this alternative representation and demonstrate
how the global solution can be solved for numerically.
• We work through an example demonstrating the practical
applicability of our approach to robotic systems. Particu-
larly, we indicate how an autonomous vehicle can (in real
time) avoid collision with a dynamic obstacle when an
unreliable perception module is responsible for tracking
it.
II. FORMULATION
We begin presentation of our framework by first introducing
a model of the types of autonomous systems we wish to
consider. In this section and the remainder of this article,
we refer to this model as the system of consideration itself,
although it should be kept in mind that all properties stated
are either modeling assumptions or properties derived from
the model.
To represent the problem of interest, we assume that the
full state of the autonomous system can be decomposed into
two independent sub-systems, which we refer to as the internal
and external systems. We assume that the internal and external
systems have independent controls and state evolutions, which
depend only on their respective states and controls. We assume
that both systems are able to observe their own state at all
times, that the external system can observe the internal system
at all times, and that the internal system can observe the
external system in an impersistent manner, meaning obser-
vations can be lost and regained at arbitrary times. We take
the perspective of the internal system, and aim to control it in
a manner that maintains a safety specification involving both
systems, robust to potentially impersistent observations of and
adversarial control by the external system.
An example of a system with such a decomposition can
be seen in Figure 1, in which the vehicle is the internal
system and the obstacle (cat) is the external system. There,
the steering rate and acceleration of the vehicle might be the
internal controls, and the directional velocity of the cat might
be the external control. Because the vehicle is tracking the cat
using an unreliable perception module, the observations of the
cat are assumed to be impersistent.
Assume without loss of generality that time begins at some
t0 ≥ 0, at which point the state of both systems are known
to both systems, within some bounded error tolerance. Define
xint ∈ Rnint and xext ∈ Rnext as the internal and external states,
respectively, evolving according to the dynamics:
x˙int(t) = fint(xint(t),uint(t)), t ∈ [t0, t f ] (1)
x˙ext(t) = fext(xext(t),uext(t)), t ∈ [t0, t f ]
with control signals drawn from the set of measurable func-
tions:
uint(·) ∈ Uint = {φint : [t0, t f ]→Uint :
φint is measurable},
uext(·) ∈ Uext = {φext : [t0, t f ]→Uext :
φext is measurable}.
(2)
where Uint ⊂ Rmint and Uext ⊂ Rmext are compact subsets of
the input spaces Rmint ,Rmext .
We assume that the function representing the dynamics of
the internal system, fint : Rnint ×Uint → Rnint , is uniformly
continuous, bounded, and Lipschitz continuous in its first ar-
gument. As such, for every initial external system state xint0 ∈
Rnint and internal control signal uint(·) ∈ Uint , then as stated
in [8], there exists a unique trajectory ξint(t; t0,xint0,uint(·))
satisfying:
d
dt
ξint(t; t0,xint0,uint(·)) =
fint(ξint(t; t0,xint0,uint(·)),uint(t)),
(3)
ξint(t0; t0,xint0,uint(·)) = xint0. (4)
Similarly, define the inverse trajectory of the internal system
as follows. Let ξ−1int be the trajectory which propagates states
forward in time starting from some state x−1int0 at t0 up until time
t, using the reverse-time dynamics of the internal system:
d
ds
ξ−1int (t; t0,x
−1
int0,uint(·)) =
− fint(ξ−1int (t; t0,x−1int0,uint(·)),uint(t)),
(5)
ξint(t0; t0,x−1int0,uint(·)) = x−1int0. (6)
With a slight abuse of notation, x−1int0 is used to indicate the
initial state of the reverse-time trajectory mapping ξ−1int , and is
not related to the variable xint0 in any direct way.
The same assumptions are made on the dynamics of the
external system, such that state trajectories of the internal
system are defined analogously of those of the internal system,
and given by ξext(t; t0,xext0,uext(·)) and ξ−1ext (t; t0,x−1ext0,uext(·)).
To formally define the impersistent observation model on
the external system, we define Σ to be a σ -algebra on [0,∞),
and let T∈ Σ be a set of potentially open and infinite intervals
on [0,∞), unknown to the internal system, which denote
periods of time in which the internal system’s observations of
the external system are lost. Define yint(t) ∈ Rnint ×{Rnext ∪
∅} to be the observation of the internal system at time t,
with ∅ representing the next -dimensional empty value. The
observation model is then given by
yint(t) =

[
xᵀint(t), x
ᵀ
ext(t)
]ᵀ
t /∈ T[
xᵀint(t), ∅ᵀ
]ᵀ
t ∈ T
(7)
Conversely, the observation model for the external system is
simply given by
yext(t) =
[
xᵀint(t), x
ᵀ
ext(t)
]ᵀ
, ∀t ∈ [t0, t f ]. (8)
These definitions formalize the notion that for times t ∈T, the
internal system can only observe its own state, and not the
external state.
Finally, we define a quantitative notion of safety of the inter-
nal system, which is given by the function d :Rnint×Rnext →R.
The joint internal and external state of the system at time t is
defined to be safe (for the internal system) if
d(xint(t),xext(t))≥ 0. (9)
Therefore, we can think of the function d as some signed
distance to the set of unsafe system configurations.
The objective of the internal system is to remain safe for all
t ∈ [t0, t f ] and all possible T. We can, without loss of generality,
assume that T = (t0, t f ], since any control policy that is safe
without observations of the external system will also be safe
with those observations, whereas the converse is in general not
true. Under this assumption, T does not include the point t0,
since the initial state of each systems is assumed to be known
to both systems at t0.
The assumption that T = (t0, t f ] may appear overly-
conservative, since in practice the internal system is at least
intended to receive observations of the external system. How-
ever, if we wish the internal system to truly be robust to the
possibility of lack of observations at any and all times, we
must assume such is true in the analysis and design of our
system. Therefore this choice does not introduce additional
conservatism into the formulation. During the actual execution
of the system, any received observations should and will be
used to allow proficient behavior of the system, which we
discuss in Section II-A.
Given the assumptions on T, the function indicating whether
the initial internal and external system configurations will be
safe for all time [t0, t f ] can be stated as the sign of the following
value function:
Vint(xint0,xext0, t0, t f ) =
sup
uint (·)∈Uint
inf
uext (·)∈Uext
min
t∈[t0,t f ]
d(xint(t),xext(t))
s.t. xint(t) = ξint(t; t0,xint0,uint(·))
xext(t) = ξext(t; t0,xext0,uext(·))
(10)
This function computes the least signed-distance encountered
to unsafe configurations along the worst-case trajectory of the
unobserved external system, and best-effort trajectory of the
internal system. A non-negative value function indicates that
the internal system can remain safe, despite failure to observe
the external system and its adversarial attempts to render
the internal system unsafe. A negative value, meanwhile,
indicates that there exists control actions by the external
system such that no control signal of the internal system can
maintain safety for all time, at least without observations of
the external system. We wish to compute the super-zero-level
set of (10), or equivalently compute the exact set of all safe
initial configurations of the system.
Note that in (10), the optimization for both systems’ control
signals are open-loop, i.e. neither is an explicit function of
the state of either system (besides the initial states, xint0 and
xext0). This is because the internal system is assumed to be
unable to observe the state of the external system for all times
t > t0, and therefore unable to react to its position during times
of unobservability. Since the optimization over the external
system control is chosen inside the optimization over internal
control signals, this information structure does allow for the
external control signal to be chosen knowing the position of
the internal system. In this situation, there is no difference
between an open-loop and closed-loop control signal for the
external system. We note that in game theoretic terms, this
game can be described as an open-loop Stackelberg game, in
which the internal system is the lead player.
Looking at the structure of (10), it is not obvious how
to evaluate the value function for arbitrary inputs, let alone
compute the super-zero-level set. This is mainly as it requires
solving difficult nested optimizations for each evaluation. This
difficulty exists even in offline settings in which real-time
evaluation is not necessary. Unlike the case with closed-loop
differential games, the game value function in this form cannot
even be pre-computed using offline dynamic programming,
due to the open-loop nature of the information structure. This
is because, while the state of the external system is known
to the internal system at time t0, for all t > t0, the state of
external system is unknown.
That being said, we will see that because the internal
and external system have independent dynamics, (10) can
be reformulated in a way that does allow for a dynamic
programming solution, allowing its offline computation to
leverage standard methods. This alternative formulation will
rely on first computing the forward reachable set (FRS) of the
external system (set of all states the external system can reach
from its initial position), and then computing the backwards
avoid tube for the internal system (set of all initial states of
the internal system that can avoid the FRS of the external
system). Using this method to compute the game value (10)
offline, the value and a resultant control policy can be used in
online, real-time execution of the system.
We first formally define the forward reach set of the external
system, denoted Rext(t,xext0; t0) for time t ∈ [t0, t f ]. This is the
set of all states x at time t that the external system can reach
with admissible control signals, starting from xext0 at time t0.
Equivalently, this is the set of all states x at time t0 from which
the inverse trajectory of the external system can reach xext0 at
time t f .
Rext(t,xext0; t0)
:= {x ∈ Rnext : ∃ uext(·) ∈ Uext
s.t. ξext(t; t0,xext0,uext(·)) = x}
= {x ∈ Rnext : ∃ uext(·) ∈ Uext
s.t. ξ−1ext (t; t0,x,uext(·)) = xext0}
(11)
Using the second definition, Rext(t,xext0; t0) can easily be
expressed as the sub-zero-level set of the following value
function:
VRext (x, t,xext0; t0) := inf
uext (·)∈Uext
‖z(t)− xext0‖
s.t. z(t) = ξ−1ext (t; t0,x,uext(·))
(12)
Following immediately from the definition,
VRext (x, t0,xext0; t0) = ‖x− xext0‖. (13)
The following theorem shows that VRext (x, t,xext0; t0) , and
consequently Rext(t,xext0; t0), can be numerically solved for
all t ∈ [t0, t f ] using a variational Hamiltonian-Jacobi partial
differential equation.
Theorem 1: Suppose fext :Rnext ×Uext→Rnext , is uniformly
continuous, bounded, and Lipschitz continuous in its first
argument. Then the value function VRext (x, t,xext0; t0) defined
in (12) is the unique viscosity solution of the variational
Hamilton-Jacobi PDE:
∂VRext
∂ t
+H = 0,
∀t ∈ [t0, t f ],x ∈ Rnext ,
(14)
with initial condition:
VRext (x, t0,xext0; t0) = ‖x− xext0‖, (15)
where the Hamiltonian, H, is defined by:
H = min
u∈Uext
∂VRext
∂x
(x, t,xext0; t0) · (− fext(x,u)) . (16)
Proof: (see [9], Section II).
Therefore, this PDE can be solved numerically to obtain the
set Rext(t,xext0; t0), which can then be used to define a new,
pessimistic safety function, which eliminates the need to know
the exact state xext(t).
dˆ(xint , t,xext0; t0) := min
xext∈Rext (t,xext0;t0)
d(xint ,xext). (17)
Observe that the safety of the internal system at time
t can equivalently be expressed through the condition
dˆ(xint(t), t,xext0; t0)≥ 0. We note that this function in general
may also be difficult to evaluate, however, as it too requires
solving a potentially difficult optimization problem for each
evaluation. By defining the set D to be the sub-zero-level set
of the function dˆ, we can construct an alternative pessimistic
safety function that will equivalently represent our safety
criterion. First define the set
D˜(t,xext0; t0)⊂ Rnint :=
pro jint(D∩ (Rext(t,xext0; t0)×Rnint )).
(18)
Here pro jint is the projection operator, projecting arguments
into the state space of the internal system. In words, for a
given time t, and initial state xext0 at initial time t0, the set
D˜(t,xext0; t0) is the set of all states xint such that there exists
a xext reachable by the external system at time t, such that
the pair (xint ,xext) is unsafe. Now we define the alternate
pessimistic safety function as the signed distance to this set:
d˜(xint ,xext0, t; t0) :=
{
minx∈D˜(t,xext0;t0) ‖x− xint‖ xint /∈ D˜
−minx/∈D˜(t,xext0;t0) ‖x− xint‖ xint ∈ D˜
(19)
Using this alternate pessimistic safety function, we define a
new value function,
V˜int(xint0,xext0, t, t0, t f ) =
sup
uint (·)∈Uint
min
s∈[t,t f ]
d˜(xint(s),s,xext0; t0)
s.t. xint(s) = ξint(s; t,xint0,uint(·))
(20)
Note that
V˜int(x,xext0, t f , t0, t f ) = d˜(x, t f ,xext0; t0). (21)
Here, an extra argument on time is present in contrast to the
function Vint in (10). When evaluated at t = t0, however, the
value function V˜int has an equivalent zero-level set as Vint .
Since we are ultimately interested in the super-zero-level set
of Vint , we can equivalently work with V˜int , which we will
show can also be computed with known methods. Given the
definition of this new value function, it becomes evident that
the super-zero-level set, when evaluated at a particular xext0,
is the set of states xint0 for which the internal system can
avoid the set D˜(t,xext0; t0), for all t ∈ [t0, t f ]. This is precisely
the definition of backwards avoid-tube of the set D˜(t,xext0; t0),
which we denote by Aint :
Aint(t, D˜(·, ·; ·),xext0; t0, t f ) :=
{x ∈ Rnint : ∃uint(·) ∈ Uext ,
s.t. ξint(s; t,x,uint(·)) /∈ D˜(s,xext0; t0), ∀s ∈ [t, t f ]}.
(22)
In this definition, the argument t is the time corresponding to
the beginning of the internal system trajectory, where as the
set D˜ is always computed with respect to initial time t0.
Similar to VRext (x, t,xext0; t0), the value function
V˜int(x,xext , t, t0, t f ) (for a particular xext , t0, and t f ), and
hence the avoid tube Aint(t, D˜,xext0; t0, t f ), can be solved
using a HJ PDE.
Theorem 2: Suppose fint :Rnint ×Uint →Rnint , is uniformly
continuous, bounded, and Lipschitz continuous in its first
argument. Then the value function V˜int(x,xext , t, t0, t f ) is the
unique viscosity solution of the variational Hamilton-Jacobi
PDE:
0 = max
{
∂V˜int
∂ t
+H, d˜(x, t,xext0; t0)−V˜int(x,xext , t, t0, t f )
}
∀t ∈ [t0, t f ],x ∈ Rnint ,
(23)
with terminal condition:
V˜int(x,xext0, t f , t0, t f ) = d˜(x, t f ,xext0; t0), (24)
where the Hamiltonian is defined by:
H = min
u∈Uint
∂V˜int
∂x
(x,xext , t, t0, t f ) · fint(x,u). (25)
Proof: (see [7], Theorem 1).
Therefore, by first solving the partial differential equation
given by (14), (15), (16), and then the partial differential
equation corresponding to (23), (24), (25), we can obtain a
value function for which the super-zero-level set denotes the
set of all safe states for the internal system, with the initial
configuration of the external system parameterized by xext0 and
despite un-observability of the external system. We denote this
set the Eyes-Closed Safety Kernel of the internal system.
E(t, t0, t f ) = {(xint ,xext) : V˜int(xint ,xext , t, t0, t f )≥ 0} (26)
Here we make an important note. In order to compute
E(t, t0, t f ), both of the PDEs must be solved for all xext0
of interest. However, both PDEs can in general be solved
for an entire set of xext0 simultaneously. This formulation
would simply result in PDEs which have state dimension
equal to 2next and (nint +next) for the first and second PDEs,
respectively. The equations given in (14), (15), (16), (23), (24),
and (25) are still valid in this case, as the states xext0 do
not evolve through time. We made explicit the computation
of both PDEs as functions of a particular xext0 since in
practice, symmetries in the problem can be exploited to avoid
computing the full PDEs, which can be expensive or even
intractable to compute. We demonstrate this technique in the
example in Section III.
A. System Execution
We stated that the result of the preceding calculations, the
eyes-closed safety kernel, could be used for safe autonomous
execution when the external system is unobserved as well as
when it is observed. Recall that T (the intervals of time for
which the external system observations are lost) is unknown
to the internal system. However, we assume that the internal
system is endowed with the ability to know at some t ∈ [t0, t f ]
if t ∈ T. In other words, the internal system is able to
instantaneously detect that it has lost observations of the
external system, through use of an anomaly detection module
or by some other means.
Note that since the dynamics of both the internal and
external systems do not depend on time, the value func-
tions computed are temporal-shift invariant. This means that
E(xint ,xext ,0,0, t f ) provides a safe operating region for which
the internal system can operate in, guaranteeing the existence
of a safe control signal for t f seconds.
Over those t f seconds, the optimal control for the internal
system at state xint at time t with last-known observation of
the external system at xext0 is given by
u∗int(xint , t;xext0, t f ) =
arg min
u∈Uint
dV˜int
dxint
(xint ,xext0, t,0, t f ) · fint(xint ,u)
(27)
If at any time before the t f seconds are expired, the internal
system detects that t /∈ T and observations of the external
system are regained, then the control of the internal system
can resume nominal control designed to satisfy some other
objective, subject to remaining in the set E(0,0, t f ). We note
that by definition, there always exist control actions that keep
the system within E, regardless of the control of the external
system. A practical way to ensure that the system never leaves
the set is to monitor the value V˜int(xint ,xext ,0,0, t f ) and switch
to the control defined in (27) if the value drops within some
tolerance above 0.
We further note that the guarantees provided on safety are
only valid for t f seconds after observations are lost. However,
by taking t f very large in the computation of (26), we can
obtain guarantees for arbitrarily long intervals of time. In
practice, often the value functions of interest are convergent
anyways, in which case they converge to the infinite-horizon
solution. When that is the case, the safety guarantees never
expire.
B. Note on Sub-Optimal Approximations
There may exist systems for which the decomposition of the
internal and external systems is not possible, yet consideration
of the loss of observation of the external states is still desired.
In these cases, the method presented here does not directly
apply, although modifications can be made to compute sub-
optimal yet conservative approximations of the sets defined.
One such approximation is to fix a control policy for the
internal system, so that the state trajectory of the internal
system can be evaluated and incorporated into the objective of
the external system. Then, computing the set of initial relative
configurations of the internal and external system such that
the external system can reach unsafe relative states, an over
approximation of the unsafe relative initial configurations is
defined. By taking the complement of this set as the safe
operating region for the internal system, the same guarantees
on safety that are made in the exact method hold, although
this approximation to the safe operating region may be sig-
nificantly smaller or even empty compared to the true safe
operating region. We note that almost all systems of practical
consideration are in fact decomposable in the manner outlined,
and therefore do not introduce any additional conservatism.
III. EXAMPLE
To demonstrate the method presented, we work through
an example situation that is common to autonomous ground
vehicles. The situation we wish to model is the interaction
between a vehicle (internal system) and a dynamic obstacle
(external system). As is typical for autonomous vehicles, the
state of the external dynamic obstacle is estimated by the
internal system using sensors. We assume that the internal
system receives impersistent observations of the external sys-
tem, which are exact within some bounded tolerance. This
resembles a situation in which the internal system is using a
data-driven algorithm to detect and track obstacles, but may
encounter and detect out of distribution inputs, at which points
in the perception module can not be trusted.
We assume for the sake of visualization that both the vehicle
and dynamic obstacle are modeled as Dubins Cars. Therefore,
their state vectors are both 3-dimensional, making the sets de-
fined in Section II easy to visualize. The dimension of the two
systems need not be the same, and indeed, higher dimensional
systems can be considered to represent more realistic systems
(barring some computational limits as discussed in Section
III-A).
The internal system is considered safe if and only if the
two vehicles do not collide. For the sake of simplicity and
readability, we assume that each car is spherical with radii
equal to r. Then the set of safe states is defined to be the
super-zero-level set of the function
d(xint ,xext) := (x1− x4)2+(x2− x6)2− (2r)2, (28)
where the dynamics of the internal system are given by
x˙1(t) = u1(t) · cos(x3(t))
x˙2(t) = u1(t) · sin(x3(t))
x˙3(t) = u2(t),
(29)
and the dynamics of the dynamic obstacle (external system)
Fig. 2. Visualization of the set Rext(5.0,0;0). The states inside the yellow
volume are all the possible states the external system can reach in 5.0 seconds.
Fig. 3. Visualization of the set D˜(5.0,0;0). The states inside the yellow
volume are all of the states of the internal system, relative to the last known
position of the external system (xext0), such that collision at the current
time is possible. Note the invariance of the set with respect to the relative
heading dimension (x3− x6(0)). This is because collision should be avoided,
irrespective of the heading of the two sub-systems.
are given by
x˙4(t) = u3(t) · cos(x6(t))
x˙5(t) = u3(t) · sin(x6(t))
x˙6(t) = u4(t).
(30)
We assume that both agents are limited by the control
bounds,
u1 ∈ [0,4], u2 ∈[−1.0,1.0]
u3 ∈ [0,3], u4 ∈[−0.75,0.75].
(31)
We solve for the sets Rext(t,xext0;0), D˜(t,xext0;0), and
Aint(t, D˜,xext0; t0, t f ), defined in Section II. We assume without
loss of generality that t0 = 0, and solve for t f = 5.0. We find
that this time horizion is sufficient for the set Aint to converge
to within an acceptably small tolerance.
To solve for the set Rext(t,xext0;0) we use the Level Set
Toolbox [10], a Matlab [11] software package for solving
partial differential equations using the level set method [12].
This set is visualized in Figure 2 for t = 5.0, and xext0 = 0,
where 0 is the zero vector. To compute the set D˜, we first
observe that the forward reachable set of the external system is
Fig. 4. Visualization of the set Aint(0, D˜,0;0,5.0). The states inside the green
volume are the initial states of the internal system, relative to the initial state
of the external system, that must be avoided in order to guarantee collision
is avoided for t f seconds, even in the event that observations of the external
system are lost at any time.
Fig. 5. Visualization of the Eyes-Closed Safety Kernel, Aint(0, D˜,0;0,5.0),
and the Forward Reachable Set of the obstacle, D˜(5.0,0;0), for the slice X3−
X6(0)= pi . Here we see that despite the green vehicle (internal system) starting
within the FRS of the orange vehicle (external system), the green vehicle lies
within the Eyes-Closed Safety Kernel. This means that the dynamics of the
combined system are such that there exists a maneuver by the green vehicle
which can evade the orange vehicle, despite losing observability.
invariant with respect to the initial condition xext0, up to a rigid
transformation (rotation and translation). Therefore, we can
solve for Rext(t,0;0), and then compute the sets D˜(t,xext0;0)
and Aint(t, D˜,xext0;0,5.0) in relative coordinates x1 − x4(0),
x2 − x5(0), and x3 − x6(0). Here, we have avoided having
to compute the sets for all possible values of xext0, as was
discussed in Section II.
To see how this is done, first consider D˜(t,0;0). We project
the set Rext(t,0;0) on to the (x4, x5) plane, relabel the
coordinates from x4 → (x1 − x4(0)), x5 → (x2 − x5(0)), and
x6→ (x3− x6(0)), take the Minkowski sum of the projection
with a circle of radius 2r (to account for the geometry of
both systems), and then extrude the set in the (x3 − x6(0))
dimension. The result of these operations are visualized in
Figure 3 for t = 5.0. Finally, we compute the time-varying
backwards avoid-tube of D˜(t,0;0), denoted Aint(t, D˜,0;0,5.0).
This set is computed again using the Level Set toolbox, and
is displayed in Figure 4 at t = 0.
Interpreting the set Aint(0, D˜,0;0,5.0), we see that it makes
intuitive sense. The super-zero-level set (free space outside the
green volume in Figure 4) is the set of all initial configurations
of the internal and external systems, such that the internal
system can escape collision despite adversarial control by
the external system and without observations of the external
system. The regions that are unable to avoid collision are
those in which the initial configuration of the two systems are
already in collision, or when the internal system is initially
headed towards the external system, and cannot turn away in
time due to the limited control authority on u2 (note that the
set wraps at (x3− x6(0)) = ±pi due to the periodicity of the
relative heading). Because the bounds on u1 are greater than
those on u3, the internal system can escape collision from all
other initial configurations.
While the result of the computations thus far in this example
are sufficient to synthesize a controller which is able to avoid
obstacles after observations are lost, it has been assumed that
the obstacle to be avoided was observed before observations
were lost. However, in dynamic environments, there are often
situations in which no obstacles might be detected, such as
when an obstacle is beyond the sensing range of the ego
vehicle. Such a situation can also be accounted for using
the method presented here. Specifically for this example, we
first compute the set Rext(t,Ssense;0), which is defined to
be the forward reachable set of the external system when
starting from any state beyond the ego-vehicle’s sensing radius
(relative to the origin):
Ssense := {
[
x4 x5 x6
]ᵀ : x24+ x25 ≥ r2sense}. (32)
Here rsense is the sensing radius.
Code for generating the sets presented in this example is
provided at https://www.redacted for double blind.review.
A. Notes on Computation
At the root of this method is the offline computation of
the numerical solution of two partial differential equations.
For PDEs without special structure, computing the numerical
solution requires defining a grid over the state space and com-
puting spatial derivatives at every grid point; the computation
time thus scales exponentially with the dimension of the state
space [9]. In practice, we are limited in the dimension of
systems for which we can compute these safety guarantees by
the computation required to do so. Nevertheless, with clever
representation of the systems, many interesting problems more
complicated than the one presented here can be solved using
this framework.
Another noteworthy fact is that space discretization can
introduce errors in the computation of the value functions of
interest, although the discretization error tends to zero as bin
size tends to zero [13]. Some artifacts from the discretization
error can be seen in Figure 4, particularly in places where
the set creases. The possibility that these artifacts may ap-
pear should be taken into account when constructing safety
arguments for systems using this method.
The computational burden at run-time is minimal, and
requires simply looking up the pre-computed value and corre-
sponding maximizing control from the grid, which is indexed
by the configuration of the internal and external systems. The
time taken by this operation is on the order of miliseconds.
IV. RELATED WORK
The framework and method presented in this article stems
most directly from the large body of work which has lever-
aged the Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equations to transform optimal
control problems into numerically solvable partial differential
equations. An overview of HJ optimal control formulations is
given in [9]. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equations simi-
larly allow for transforming fully observable differential games
into partial differential equations, as demonstrated in [14], [13]
[7]. The work presented in this article is a differential game
of sorts, although due to the impersistent observability of the
external system, the standard HJI pursuit-evasion formulation
does not apply, necessitating the method we have developed.
The set of all safe initial configurations in the persistently
observed case is a strict super-set of the eyes-closed safety
kernel defined here.
There are recent works that have leveraged HJ and HJI
equations to capture other interesting information patterns
arising in problems common to autonomous systems. For
example, in [15], [16] and [17], a dynamic game is formulated
to capture the mismatch between a motion planning model
and a high-fidelity model of the system attempting to track the
plans. This allows for planning trajectories that are guaranteed
to be trackable by the high-fidelity model. These works
are extended in [18] and [19], allowing for limited sensing
radii. Meanwhile, [20] leverages a similar idea to generate
trajectories that incorporate system tracking error and will not
have any at-fault collisions in unforeseen environments with
limited sensing radius. All of these methods assume that the
internal system has persistent observations of all obstacles, at
least within some sensing radius. The methods developed in
these works do not apply when observation is lost.
Other works involve different considerations of the percep-
tion system in autonomous vehicles. In [21], for example,
the authors consider the role of perception latency in safe
avoidance of obstacles. Perhaps most similar to our work, from
a motivation standpoint, is [22], in which the authors attempt to
learn a system that simultaneously detects perception failures
and generates corrective action. However, that method does not
include any formal safety analysis of the control actions that
are generated. Furthermore, because such a system is learned
from data, it may unfortunately encounter the same failure
modes that such a method attempts to be robust to in the first
place.
Recently, [23] formulated a robust control problem ac-
counting for a learned perception module, although there
the analysis requires that the dynamics of the autonomous
system is a linear, time invariant ordinary differential equation.
Furthermore, the high-dimensional inputs to the perception
system, at test-time, are assumed to come from the same
distribution of inputs at train-time. Therefore, the method
presented there addresses a much more structured situation
than the one considered here.
It is also important to note that although we leverage exact
reachable set computations to formulate our problem, tech-
niques other than solving HJ PDEs can be used to find them.
For example, [24] use RRT-type sampling to approximate such
sets. Again, in that work, the obstacle avoidance and reachable
sets considered do not represent the loss of observability
situation we consider here.
There are of course many works which have considered
obstacle avoidance in the presence of noisy or uncertain
measurements, such as [25], [26], and [27], to cite just a
few examples. Furthermore, there have been works which
have tackled this problem in the context of formal methods,
providing formal guarantees of safety in such observation
models, as in [28]. However, again, consideration of noisy
or purely partial observations is a different problem than the
problem we address in this paper, and those works should be
taken as complementary to the work presented here.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a framework for optimally accounting
for detected loss of observations of autonomous systems. We
showed that in order to be robust to the situation defined, the
control of the internal system must assume it will lose and
never regain observations of the external system. Therefore,
the internal system must always stay within a set of relative
positions with respect to the external system, to ensure that
even if the observations are in fact lost, there still exists a safe
maneuver that avoids all possible trajectories of the external
system.
We first formulated this problem as an open-loop differential
Stackelberg game, and then showed how it can be recast in
a manner that allows its solution to be found by solving two
related partial differential equations.
This method results in a safe operating region for the
autonomous system; here, we call it the Eyes-Closed Safety
Kernel. If the autonomous system is able to detect instanta-
neously that it has lost observations, then by staying within
the Eyes-Closed Safety Kernel for all time, and executing the
control defined in (27) whenever observations are lost, the
system is guaranteed to maintain safety as long as the system
obeys the modeling assumptions made.
Although the detection of perception failure is a very
challenging problem in practice, the framework presented here
demonstrates that it is possible to safely account for these fail-
ures if they can be detected. This method therefore motivates
further research on developing better methods for predicting
when perception modules are incorrect, and can already be
used with existing methods for predicting perception failures.
Even if not every perception failure is detected, the framework
we present provides a means for guaranteeing robustness to
those that are predicted.
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